U. S. Policy Options and Iran: Realists Can Be Diplomats Too!

The comments posted about the previous article by a colleague of mine raised some interesting questions that deserve further consideration. 

Make no mistake about it. Iran will, sooner or later, possess nuclear capability. The capacity to reach U.S. soil with that capability remains to be seen and is currently, many years away. 

This conclusion is a simple one and not a stretch of the imagination when past behavior is looked at as the best predictor of future behavior. In this case, past Presidents were adamant about North Korea not acquiring nuclear weapons. Sanctions were useless and current estimates suggest the rogue state has between 7 and 11 nukes.Therefore, Washington needs to approach Iran's nuclear ambitions from a more realist perspective. 

The following are three possible policy options that take a diplomatic, but hard stance toward curbing Iran's ambitions.

Motivating  Moscow

The current tension between Washington and Moscow over Russia vetoing the U.N. Resolution requiring Syria's Assad Regime to step down could be an opportunity for the Obama Administration to win Russian support on the Iranian issue. 

Currently, Russia is in disagreement with how the U.S. is handling both Syria and Iran. Washington should make it clear to Moscow that they can't have their cake and eat it too. The U.S. should give Russia an ultimatum stating that the U.S. will militarily support a coup in Syria unless Moscow gives their full support of Iranian sanctions. Both the United States and Russia need to realize that diplomacy is not a zero sum game. You have to give a little to get a little.


Take Advantage of the Arab Spring

The overall importance of the Arab Spring has been under valued by the Obama Administration. While a return to the days of Pan-Arabism would be a concern for Israel, what is often over looked is the fact that it would be a concern for Tehran as well.

This was evidenced by President Ahmadinejad's failed attempt to tie the Arab Spring to the same embers that sparked the Iranian Revolution. 

Washington should capitalize on this by offering economic intensives and diplomatic relations with those states that back lashed against this claim.

Israel may object to this, but it should be noted that these states are not the ones pursuing nuclear capability.

 Focus on the Next Four Years

A defining feature of the presidential race is the strong rhetoric each of the candidates are putting forth as to how they would handle the Iranian problem. Most have disregarded diplomatic talks completely, assuring that nothing short of a military strike is the key to stopping Tehran. From the Iranian perspective, that means a 50-50 chance of a U.S. military strike within a year from now. This knowledge may increase Iran's desire to speed up the refinement process and foster less cooperation with inspectors.

A key attribute of Obama's Foreign Policy is that it is more multilaterally focused than the Bush Administration or those currently in the presidential running. While President Obama has not taken the military option off of the table, it is not the central idea. 

The Obama Administration, through open diplomatic talks, needs to address the problem in a way that shows Tehran they still have time to ease the economic sanctions by meeting diplomatic requests. Diplomatic time can be bought by increasing the frequency of statements assuring Tehran that the Obama Administration will be around for four more years. 

Acknowledgments
I would like to acknowledge J. O'Day for his insight into the not so effective influence of Pan-Arabism on Israel. 

Irrationallity and Regional Stability: Israel vs. Iran

A recent New York Times article addresses the idea of Israel preemptively attacking nuclear reactor sites in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The general characterization of Israel's fears are clearly expressed yet are founded upon the misperception of rhetoric by the Republic.


Drawing on the implications of this article, it can be argued that Israel, not Iran, poses the real threat to regional stability. An analysis of the questions posed in an excerpt of the article below support this claim. 


"[Ehud] Barak laid out three categories of questions, which he characterized as “Israel’s ability to act,” “international legitimacy” and “necessity,” all of which require affirmative responses before a decision is made to attack:

1. Does Israel have the ability to cause severe damage to Iran’s nuclear sites and bring about a major delay in the Iranian nuclear project? And can the military and the Israeli people withstand the inevitable counterattack?

2. Does Israel have overt or tacit support, particularly from America, for carrying out an attack?

3. Have all other possibilities for the containment of Iran’s nuclear threat been exhausted, bringing Israel to the point of last resort? If so, is this the last opportunity for an attack?

For the first time since the Iranian nuclear threat emerged in the mid-1990s, at least some of Israel’s most powerful leaders believe that the response to all of these questions is yes."

Question 1. 
 Without question, Israel has the capability to cripple Iran's nuclear sites. Furthermore, not only do they have capability, they have historical precedence. In order to avoid Iran from getting the bomb, they must be stopped. Israel refers to preemptive attacks as a way to secure a "major delay" in their program.This option represents a mere quick fix to a serious dilemma. 


Addressing the second half of the question, surviving a counter attack, Israel could weather an immediate counter attack. Yet, what needs to be considered is the potential for Iran to wage a long, covert war with Israel through the use of Hezbollah and the IRGC. 


Question 2. 
This question should raise serious concerns for the Obama Administration. While President Obama cited the strong relationship shared by the two states in his recent State of the Union address what needs to be realized is how much influence the U.S. has over Israel. If the Obama Administration so desired, the threat of withholding monetary and security incentives could be used to curb Israel's unilateral ambitions. 


Even more, Washington needs to be aware that Iranian Foreign Policy makes no distinction between Israel and the U.S. other than the former is a puppet of the latter. Suffice it to say, an attack by Israel would be perceived by Tehran as a U.S. military action by extension. The Obama Administration cannot disregard the fact that the patience of the American people in relation to war has been spent. Obama needs to clarify that a strong U.S.-Israel relationship is not "tacit" approval for unilateral action. 


 Question 3.
While sanctions and diplomatic talks have failed to halt Iran's progress, the situation is far from lost. All efforts have not been exhausted. Talks have essentially boiled down to one requirement: "Give up your weapons, then we will make progress." Diplomatic negotiation does not work like that. Iran is not going to give up its only leverage no more than a bank robber would give up hostages. Washington needs to provide incentives for Iran to halt its nuclear program. While sticks can be found everywhere in the forest of diplomacy, carrots need time to grow. 


Finally, why expect the Islamic Republic to listen to diplomatic reason when all they hear are the continous rattleing of sabers by the Obama Administration and the 2012 presidential canidates? 
  

Closing the Strait of Hormuz: Not an Option for Iran

In light of the recent events of Iranian gunboats threatening U.S. military vessels in the Persian Gulf, interest has been renewed in the probability of the Islamic Republic blocking the Strait of Hormuz. Furthermore, what policy options are viable for the Obama Administration and its allies. Ultimately, if the strait were blocked, the only option would be to open it back up with any means necessary due to it being an international water way.

The following article was first published in 2006 while I was a columnist for the International Update, an online journal hosted by the University of California, Davis. In it, I highlight the severe consequences Iran would suffer from blocking the strait. The following is the article in its entirety. Enjoy. Comments welcome!

Dangerous Waters: Iran and the Geopolitics of the Straits of Hormuz

Written by Zarieck Smithey, Utah Valley College

Wednesday, 12 April 2006

Ever since oil was discovered in the Middle East, the region has been an area where the vital economic interests of many states have taken root. History has shown that any disturbance in the delicate geopolitical balance can severely disrupt the world’s oil market, thus making stability a crucial requirement for efficient oil production. With the nuclear issue of Iran heating up, there is little assurance for a secure market in the future.  One concern that further complicates matters is Iran’s implied threat to close the Strait of Hormuz as an answer to aggressive actions, such as economic sanctions, by the West to halt its nuclear pursuits. The potential for Iran to block the strait became more apparent after Tehran recently performed military operations in the Gulf that centered on testing a new land-to-sea missile named Kowsar and a new torpedo. Although there has been no clear statement from the regime that they would block the strait, actions such as these indicates that it remains an open option. Concerns about this possibility have been in U.S. strategic thinking for years. In a Congressional Testimony Hearing for the House Armed Services Committee Tommy Franks stated, “Tehran’s ability to interdict the Strait of Hormuz with air, and sub-surface naval units, as well as mines and missiles remains a concern.” (Franks, 3) Despite ample muscle flexing, Iran’s implied intent to cut off the strait as a response to Western pressure to stop its nuclear program is nothing more than an empty threat designed to gain leverage and portray Iran as a formidable military power in the Persian Gulf. In actual reality, the regime is fully aware that blocking the strait, which is an international waterway, would have severe consequences that come with a heavy price. Iran’s use of this threat as leverage and not actual military power can best be illustrated by its actions, or lack thereof, during the Iran-Iraq war. Even at the height of the tanker war from 1984 to 1987, the regime did not have the resolve to cut off the strait, though there were several warnings from the government to do so. Most of which were nothing more than attempts to spur the international community to put more pressure on Iraq. Furthermore, any serious attempt at blocking the strait would give way to additional, undesirable results. First, Tehran must be ready to deal with the effects it would produce in their own economy. Second, it would raise diplomatic and economic issues with Russia and China since, “China imports a large amount of its oil from Iran and both sides have recently reached a major deal on natural gas and oil supplies.” (McMahon, 1)  It is doubtful that Iran would jeopardize ties with these two states given that both have the power to veto any sanctions against Iran in the Security Council. Finally, a much bigger, and perhaps the most discouraging issue facing any Iranian effort to block the Strait of Hormuz is a response by OPEC.  “OPEC’s mission is to coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of Member Countries and ensure the stabilization of oil prices in order to secure an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consumers, a steady income to producers and a fair return on capital to those investing in the petroleum industry.” (OPEC, 1)  This would subject Iran to intense amounts of international pressure from fellow members of OPEC. Moreover, it might lead to many OPEC members siding with the West for the reason that closing the strait “would have a major impact on the profitability of oil producers and the economies of many counties around the world.”(Is There, 1)  The last thing Tehran wants is to lose potential military and diplomatic allies against the U.S. and Europe in regards to its nuclear ambitions.  In the end, whatever actions Iran takes in response to the possible coming of economic sanctions, the international community can be sure it will not be in the form of blocking the Strait of Hormuz. The costs are too great and Iran is not willing to pay the price. References  Franks, Tommy R. (March 29, 2001). “U.S. Military Posture.” Retrieved March 15, 2006 from http://web27.epnet.com/citation “Is There Any Need for Security of Oil Demand?” Retrieved March 6, 2006 from http://www.opec.org/library/FAQs/about/OPEC/q19.htm McMahon, Robert. (April 4, 2006). “Iran, the United Nations, and Sanctions.” Retrieved April 5, 2006 from http://www.cfr.org/publication/10222/ “OPEC’s Mission.” Retrieved March 6, 2006 from http://www.opec.org/home/

The Iranian Assasination Plot: Lesson's from Al Qaeda

The Iranian assasination plan turned out to be a small wake up call for U.S. policy makers and experts. The U.S. has been busy disengaging military action in Iraq and increasing their presence in Afghanistan to combat Al Qaeda. As one Iranian expert pointed out, Iran only had 3 sentences in the recent U.N. General Assembly speech by President Obama. 

It seemed that the U.S. had put Iran and their questionable nuclear program on the back burner and let the economic sanctions simmer a little. However, in light of the recent plot it appears that many policy makers and experts on Iranian-U.S. relations are jumping to huge conclusions and are calling for a tougher stance to be taken by the United States. There are several noteworthy reasons as to why the U.S. needs to apply the brakes and look for the devil in the details. 

First, many have deemed the plot to be planned and financed by the Iranian government. Though it is true that Iran and Saudi Arabia  struggle against each other for regional hegemony, it in no way  feasable for Iran to assinate the U.S. Saudi Ambassador. 

Furthermore, Iran wants nothing more than to at least appear to be a normal state. They desire to be accepted as a regional power with positive influence in the region. Whether this is true remains to be seen. 

Second, the question has been raised, most recently by Elliott Abrams, about the rationality behind the plot. Specificlly citing the fact that if Iran would carry out a major plot on the territory of a nuclear armed America without have nukes themselves it poses the question of what the regime would do with nuclear weapons. How bold would they be? 

This is a severe exaggeration resting on the idea that the higher ups in the regime were more than aware of what was happening.  Additionally, it also infers that if Iran had a nuclear weapon they would actually use it against the U.S. or its allies. Nothing could be further from reality. Iran is years away from having a working nuclear weapon. Plus, making the "bullet" as it were, is the easy part. The delivery system for long range strikes is much more complicated and is often the point in which programs become entrenched.Also, in order to have any real power the regime would have to develop their arsenal to the extent of second and third strike capabilities. Additionally, this would push the timeline back even further.

A more likely explanation of the plot can be arrived at by looking at how Al Qaeda works within a state. While it was a faction of the IRGC that planned the attack, it is more feasible that the faction was working independently rather than under the direction of the Ayatollah in a similar manner that Al Qaeda does not wait for any government orders to carry out attacks.The Quds is responsible for protecting Islamic Revolution. This may have been their goal in attacking the Saudi Ambassador since Saudi Arabia has close ties to the U.S. and some of the population has adopted Western ideas and dress. The Quds would definitely see this as an insult to the Islamic Revolution and Islam in general.

The U.S. needs to consider options that would directly target the Quds. While it is not likely, an open dialogue with the Iranian Regime would provide grounds for the U.S. to address the issue of the Quds acting unilaterally on U.S. territory and develop ways in which Islamic states can support Islam without supporting extremists. 

Furthermore, if the attack had occurred at the Saudi Embassy it would have been an attack on Saudi Soil not the U.S. thus making American casualties collateral damage. At any rate, the Obama Administration should focus on supporting Islam as a religion while taking measure to reduce their ideological presence in the region. Plus they should reinforec the idea that the U.S. is at war with terrorists not Islam; something the Bush Administration was very good at.

I Hate Politics

I really hate politics. I also hate insurance companies and pharmaceutical companies. But nothing holds a candle to my hatred of politics. Granted, it seems confusing that this blog has the word "political' in the title. Let me clarify. Political Science is not politics. Its the study of politics using scientific methods. Politics is what happens in Washington. It's fat cats sitting in comfortable chairs built with deceit, bribes, and greed. The problem with politics is nobody cares what is right only who is right. Republicans want it one way, Democrats want it another. Its like two people in a car arguing over the radio station, yet neither one is paying attention to where the car is headed. Yet, for the most part, political scientists sit silently in the background. I say for the most part because sometimes, their ideas do make to Washington. Such was the case with democratic peace theory, which basically suggests that democratic states don't war with each other. Given that, if all were democratic, then war, in theory, would be a thing of the past. However, I am realist. Yep, if you leave states alone, no matter what type of government, they will end up fighting each other. Just look at Washington. We have killed Bin Laden. I would like to think that this will have a positive effect on the relationship between republicans and democrats. It won't. It will only cause more separation. I can hear it now: "Had we been in charge, we would have gotten him earlier." "We have ended the war on terror, a war started with no real goals or objectives." Well, that's why I hate politics. That's also why I love Political Science. It provides some way to understand why things happen the way they do.